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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL

1.

Judge Rigtrup erred in the o r i g i n a l Divorce Decree in f a i l i n g t o

g r a n t alimony t o t h e
2.

Plaintiff,

wife

of

the

Defendant.

Judge Rigtrup erred in not granting a new t r i a l in the divorce

proceeding between Plaintiff and Defendant or in the alternative amending the
Judgment and altering the Decree of Divorce in conformity with the provisions
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a) and 59(e) in l i g h t of the
Appeallant's demonstration of the disproportionate division of a s s e t s a t the
time of the hearing on the Motion for the new t r i a l or a l t e r n a t i v e l y the
Motion to amend the existing Judgment and Decree of Divorce.

The Appellant

argues this error was a clear abuse of discretion and t h a t the evidence was
i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support the Judgment and Decree e n t e r e d by t h e C o u r t .
3.

Judge Rigtrup erred in f a i l i n g t o grant a new t r i a l because the

Defendant had not had her day in Court alleging f i r s t a physical incapacity
ie a hearing loss which prevented her from understanding the nature of the
proceedings involved in the judicial process a t the time set for the t r i a l on
the merits and secondly, in t h a t default was entered in a summary form of
proceeding as a r e s u l t of proffer of evidence and s t i p u l a t i o n which was
subsequently disputed by the Affidavit of the P l a i n t i f f

and where t h e

Affidavit of Plaintiff disputed the foundation for t h i s summary proceeding,
the summary proceeding as a Motion for Summary Judgment requires the Court t o
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff evidencing t h a t
no genuine issue of material f a c t e x i s t s in order t o be sustained by the
Court.

The

Appellant

argues,
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was

not

the

case.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On the 19th day of March 1985 r before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup f
District Judge in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele County,
State of Utah, the case of Joan H. Elton v. C u r t i s Beck Elton came on for
trial.

Joan Elton was present with her attorney E.H. Fankhauser and C u r t i s

Beck E l t o n was p r e s e n t

with

his

attorney

B . L.

Dart*

Evidence was submitted by s t i p u l a t i o n read i n t o the record by t h e
parties.

The Court thereafter accepted the s t i p u l a t i o n of the p a r t i e s as

read into the record, took testimony concerning grounds and j u r i s d i c t i o n and
authorized the entry of a Decree of Divorcer Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law i n conformity w i t h t h e s t i p u l a t i o n and t h e

testimony.

A Decree of Divorce was signed by Judge Rigtrup and f i l e d in Tooele
County Court Clerk's office on the 16th day of April 1985.

A motion for a

new t r i a l or in the alternative a motion to amend the judgment in conformity
with the provisions of Rule 59(a) and 59(e) of the Utah Rules of C i v i l
Procedure was filed timely with the Court and on the 20th day of May 1985 a
hearing was held on P l a i n t i f f ' s motion as stated, before the Honorable Judge
Rigtrup resulting in an Order subsequently signed by Judge Rigtrup denying
both motions.

Fran t h i s Order and frcm the Order in the form of the e x i s t i n g

Decree of Divorce t h i s appeal i s taken.

SUMMARY O F ARGUMENTS

The Summary of the Arguments e s s e n t i a l l y in t h i s case i s t h a t t h e
Appellant suggests t h a t f i r s t Judge Rigtrup was in e r r o r in not granting
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alimony t o the P l a i n t i f f .

The P l a i n t i f f has a s i g n i f i c a n t hearing l o s s

requiring the use of a mechanical hearing aid and finding i t impossible t o
hear without the same. The Judge had a duty t o prevent the P l a i n t i f f

from

becoming a public charge and in allowing the P l a i n t i f f t o l i v e as nearly as
possible a t the standard of l i v i n g she enjoyed during the course of the
marriage which duty he f a i l e d t o f u l f i l l by f a i l i n g t o g r a n t alimony.
Secondlyf the Appellant suggests that Judge Rigtrup erred in failing t o grant
a new t r i a l because of t h e A p p e l l a n t ' s c l e a r

d e m o n s t r a t i o n of a

disproportionate division of assets per the existing Decree of Divorce.

The

Appellant asserts this to be a clear abuse of discretion and asserts t h a t the
evidence i s insufficient to support the d i s t r i b u t i o n of a s s e t s in the form
and format provided by the Decree of Divorce.

The Appellant asserts t h a t the

demonstration of this disproportionate division of assets occurred c l e a r l y a t
the time of the hearing on the Appellant's Motion for a New T r i a l or in the
alternative a Motion to amend the Judgment and Decree of Divorce.

Thirdly,

the Appellant argues that the nature of this divorce proceeding was a summary
proceeding and that in a summary proceeding t h e r e can be no foundation t o
uphold judgment on a summary proceeding where there i s evidence of a dispute
as to a material fact or an issue of material fact l e f t unresolved between
the p a r t i e s .

The Decree having been founded upon proffers and an o r a l

stipulation read into the record i s subject to attack by the presentation in
a timely fashion of evidence of a disputed material fact which presentation
was properly made to Judge Rigtrup.
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT ALIMONY
TO THE PLAINTIFF WIFE
In the case of Grainme v. Gramme. 587 P2d 144 (Utah, 1978) , at page 147
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah said:
"The purpose of alimony is to provide post marital
support; it is intended neither as a penalty imposed
on the husband nor as a reward granted to the wife.
Its function is to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of living she
enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent her from
becoming a public charge. Important criteria in
determing a reasonable award for support and maintenance
are the financial conditions and needs of the wife,
considering her station in life; her ability to produce
sufficient income for herself; and the ability of the
husband to provide support."
In our case at bar the Appellant, as is affirmed in her sworn Affidavit
submitted with her Motion for a New Trial, wears a hearing aid as a result of
a severe hearing deficiency.

The Appellant in this Affidavit avers an

incapacity to hear without this hearing aid and further makes the averment
that she did not have to wear a hearing aid before she was physically abused
during the course of her marriage by her husband and has since that time
needed the assistance of this mechanical device in order to hear.

The

evidence before the Court showed a substantial capacity for income production
on the part of the Defendant husband and a very limited capacity for income
production on the part of the Plaintiff wife.

Further these affirmations as

indicated herein and in the Affidavit of the Plaintiff would show or tend to
establish a cause or one of the potential causes for this disproportionate
earning capacity and for a genuine risk evident of the Plaintiff ultimately
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becoming a public charge and failing to maintain herself in a financial
position consumate with that position maintained during the course of her
marriage.

In fact no evidence exists to the contrary.

No evidence exists

that would give rise to any presumption that the Plaintiff wifef in this case
Appellant before this Court, will have any ability to sustain herself as
nearly as possible to the standard of living which she enjoyed during the
course of the marriage.
With these arguments having been presented to Judge Rigtrup in the
Motion for a New Trial and the Motion alternatively to Amend the Judgment
and Decree of Divorce particularly with the allegation of a reduced earning
capacity predicated upon the physical abuse of the wife by the husband during
the course of the marriage, equity would demand a review of the question of
an entitlement to alimony above and beyond the Plaintiff1 s legal right to
acquire the same. This concept was not persuasive to Judge Rigtrup and the
Appellant respectfully submits that this was a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the Court and an error at law.

POINT II
IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY JUDGE RIGTRUP
IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL OR AMEND THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE IN LIGHT OF THE
APPELLANT'S DEMONSTRATION OF A DISPROPORTIONATE
DIVISION OF ASSETS
In the case of

English v. English , 565 P2d 409 (Utah 1977) at Page

410 the Court says:
"The Trial Court in a divorce actionf has considerable
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and
property interest. A party appealing therefrom has
the burden to prove there was a misunderstanding or
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misapplication of the law resulting in a substantial
and prejudical error; or the evidence clearly
preponderated against the findings; or such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse
of discretion."
This case has resulted in just such a serious inequity as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion.

The evidence submitted by Affidavit and proffered

to the Court in the hearing held on the 20th day of May 1985 before the
Honorable Judge Kenneth Rigtrup evidences a gross disparity in the division
of the marital estate. Without reciting the nature of that gross disparity
calling to the Court's attention the language of the Affidavit supporting the
Motion for a New Trial and the language contained on pages 2 through 8 of the
transcript of the hearing of May 20, 985, evidences just such inappropriate
and grossly disproportionate division of assets.

Where such evidence was

presented to the Court in a timely fashion a proper procedural review
process and where such evidence was as clearly demonstrable, it was an error
at law for Judge Rigtrup to fail to grant a new hearing on the merits or for
purposes of amending the existing judgment or simply granting a new trial.
The nature of equity would require that basically the marital estate be
divided equally between the parties as is the traditional route undertaken by
the trial courts in this state and sustained by the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah.

As the English case evidences considerable latitude and

discretion is allowed but grossly disproportionate divisions of the marital
estate are not envisioned within this latitude.

The facts allege a four to

one and three to one ratio in favor of the Defendant/Respondent in the
division of the marital estate. Allegations of that kind of disproportionate
division are so great that the Court should be charged with the responsibility
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of investigating by law and by equity. 'That investigation properly would take
the step of a hearing on the merits in the form of either a new trial or a
hearing to determine a more appropriate distribution in the form of an Amended
Judgment and Decree.

POINT III
A DEFAULT DIVORCE HEARING ATTAINS THE
SUBSTANTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF A SUMMARY
PROCEEDING AND SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS AND
JUDGMENTS RENDERED IN SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS
REQUIRE NO ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT LEFT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES
To sustain a Motion for Summary Judgment which is in essence what this
Court will be asked to do by the Respondent on appeal, the pleadings,
evidencef admissions and inferences should be most favorably reviewed from
the point of view of the party opposing the entry of the Summary Judgment or
the sustaining review of the Summary Judgment and must show that there is no
issue of material fact.
P2d 266 (Utah 1962) and

See

C. Frederick May and Company v. Dunn , 368

Bowen v. Riverton City , 656 P2d 434 (Utah 1982) •

Argumentatively even with a stipulation read into the record by the
parties and agreed to by the parties before the Judge without the
introduction of demonstrative evidence ie. testimony and documentary evidence
the Court is in essence engaged in the rendering of a Summary Judgment from
what essentially amounts to proffers by the parties and/or their counsel.
For the protection of the rights of the parties where within a timely fashion
particularly within the time provided for in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for the filing of a Motion for a New Trial, one or more of the
parties represents evidence as in the form of a sworn affidavit of the
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existance of an outstanding issue of material fact the Court cannot s u s t a i n ,
grant or endorse the Summary Judgment.
t h i s case.

That i s exactly what took place in

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly remarked in i t s decisions

in the past that the existance of issues of material f a c t w i l l preclude the
entry of a Summary Judgment and even though we a r e a n a l o g i z i n g t h e
traditional conduct of a Motion for Summary Judgment in a law and motion
setting to the summary disposition of a case in d e f a u l t divorce s e t t i n g the
analogy i s well formed.

This c l i e n t , the Appellant herein has not had her

day in Court and the Decree and Findings have been based upon, again what
essentially amounts to proffers, representations, and not upon demonstrative
evidence

or q u a n t i t a t i v e

amounts

of

sworn

testimony.

The Appellant submits t h a t e r r o r has occurred in the lower Court by
their failure to grant a new t r i a l or an amendment t o the e x i s t i n g Judgment
and Decree because substantive and material issues of f a c t have been raised
concerning the case between the parties and these i s s u e s were r a i s e d timely
and procedurally in a proper format.

Further, the Appellant r e s p e c t f u l l y

submits t h a t the Supreme Court should accept t h e analogy of the Summary
Judgment proceeding t o the summary disposition of the divorce proceeding
because of the equitable considerations required for the benefit of the
parties in a divorce proceeding where the nature of the issue of a m a t e r i a l
fact pertains to a disproportionate division of the m a r i t a l e s t a t e between
the l i t i g a n t s .

CONCLUSION
The Appellant has not been given a fair day i n Court a s s e r t i n g i n h e r
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Affidavit that she could not hear on the date that her attorney and she
appeared before Judge Rigtrup together with Mr. Dart and his client Mr.
Elton. The Appellant has not been given her day in Court because of the
nature of the summary disposition and the lack of demonstrative evidence
involving this case. The Appellant has been given a grossly inadequate and
disproportionate division of assets in the case and has not been given
alimony to any degree even in light of her physical limitations and the
disproportionate earning capacities. The Appellant has availed herself the
appropriate procedural steps for the review by the lower Court and has failed
to gain an open ear.

The Appellant respectfully submits that this case is

pregnant with inequities and errors of law and requires a remander to the
trial Court with a direction for a new trial on the m e r i t s .
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of November, 1985.

likh IQA^-AA

WILLIAM B. PARSONS III
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true, correct and complete
copy of the document to which this certificate is appended or included was
hand delivered to the hereinafter designated addressee on the 27th day of
November, 1985:
B.L. Dart
Attorney at Law
310 South Main #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah

84101
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOAN H. ELTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CURTIS BECK ELTON,
Defendant•

DECREE OF DIVORCE
Civil No. 84-347
Consolidated with
Civil No. 84-348
Judge Rigtrup

This cause came on for trial at a regular term of the
above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, on March 19, 1985, the
Honorable Kenneth •• Rigtrup, District Judge, presiding.

Plaintiff

was present in person and represented by her attorney, E. H.
Fankhauser.

Defendant was present in person and represented by

his attorney, Bert L. Dart.

The parties, through their respective

attorneys, entered into a stipulation concerning all of the matters
in the above entitled action; and which stipulation was acknowledged,
accepted and approved by the parties hereto, and which stipulation
was approved by the Court and ordered to be included in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of Divorce herein;

and, the default of Defendant having been duly entered by the
Court to the Complaint of Plaintiff; and the Plaintiff having
been duly sworn and testified in support of the allegations of
her Complaint on file herein; and more than ninety (90) days
having lapsed since the commencement of this action; and the
matter having been submitted to the Court for its determination
and decision; and the Court, having made and entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and in accordance therewith, now,
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That Plaintiff, JOAN ELTON, be and is hereby granted

a Decree of Divorce from Defendant, CURTIS BECK ELTON, dissolving
the bonds of matrimony presently existing between Plaintiff and
Defendant, which Decree of Divorce is to become final upon entry.
2.

Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded as her sole and

separate property, free and clear of all claims of Defendant,
the following, to-wit:
(a)

The home and residence owned by Plaintiff

before marriage located at 28 0 Marvista, Tooele, Utah
subject to the balance of the mortgage indebtedness
thereon which he is to assume and pay;
(b)

All furniture, household furnishings, appliances

and effects in her possession, except for the items
specifically awarded to Defendant;
(c)

1969 Corvette owned before marriage; 1981

Toyota pickup truck, subject to the balance of the
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obligation owing thereon to Tooele Federal Credit Union
which she is to assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless;
(d)

Ten (10) shares American Western Insurance

stock owned before marriage; 118 shares Pacific Gas and
Electric stock (100 shares preferred, 18 shares common);
(e)

All bank accounts in Plaintiff's name, including

Plaintiff's IRA account.

Defendant's IRA account with

Tooele Federal Credit Union.

Defendant is ordered to

change over his IRA account to the name of Plaintiff;
(f)

$10,000.00 representing Plaintiff's share of the

equity in and to the tri-plex property, which sum is to
be paid out at the rate of $300.00 per month commencing
on or before April 15, 1985 and the 15th day of each and
every month thereafter with interest at the rate of ten
(10%) per annum until paid in full.

Plaintiff is to have

a first mortgage lien on the tri-plex to secure payment
of this amount;
(g)

All building materials in Plaintiff's possession,

together her personal property, clothing, jewelry and effects.
3.

Defendant be and is hereby awarded as his sole and

separate property, free and clear of all claims of Plaintiff, the
following, to-wit:
(a)

The tri-plex located at 261 Marvista, Tooele,

Utah, subject to any and all indebtedness and encumbrances
thereon which he is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff
harmless and subject to a mortgage lien in favor of
-7-

Plaintiff in the sum of $10,000,00 payable at the
rate of $300.00 per month commencing on or before the
15th day of April, 1985 and the 15th day of each and
every month thereafter until paid in full, together with
interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum;
(b)

The Scotch Futures owned by Defendant before

marriage; all proceeds from the sale of the Jonathan Logan
stock; together with Defendant's bank accounts in his
name, except for Defendant's IRA account with Tooele Federal
Credit Union, which account and all sums on deposit therein
is to be awarded to Plaintiff.

Defendant is to arrange

for transfer of the IRA account to the name of Plaintiff;
(c)

1978 Toyota Landcruiser, one-third (1/3) interest

in the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck with camper, subject
to the balance of the indebtedness owing thereon which
Defendant is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff
harmless; the 198 5 Chevrolet Van, subject to the indebtedness owing thereon which Defendant is to assume and pay
and hold Plaintiff harmless; one-half (1/2) interest in
the boat, motor and trailer, the Honda motorcycle with
trailer, the one-third (1/3) interest in the 1953 Willy's
Jeep; 1976 Vega owned before marriage;
(d)

The items of furniture, furnishings and appliances

in possession of Defendant, together with the furniture
received from his mother consisting of a couch, love seat,
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bedroom set, washer and dryer;
(e)

Defendant's retirement account with the

United States Government, Department of the Army;
(f)

The residence recently purchased located at

291 East Broadway, Tooele, Utah;
(g)

Defendant's tools, including his table saw

and drill press and his own personal property, clothing,
jewelry and effects.
4.

Each of the parties are awarded two of the lots located

at Gold Hill Townsite, Tooele County, Utah.

Plaintiff is to have

thirty (30) days from the date of the entry of this Decree of
Divorce to elect which lots she desires to be awarded to her.
Should Plaintiff fail to elect which lots she desires to be
awarded to her, Plaintiff will be awarded Lots 18 and 26, Block D,
Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah;
and Defendant will be awarded Lots 17 and 27, Block C, Gold Hill
Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah.
5.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the balance

of the mortgage indebtedness owing on her home, the balance of
the loan obligation owing on the 1981 Toyota pickup truck, Sears,
Wards, J.C. Penneys and any obligations and debts she has incurred
since commencing this action and hold Defendant harmless.
6.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all debts and

obligations owing on the tri-plex, GMAC on the 198 5 Chevrolet Van,
GMAC on the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck, the obligation owing to
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First Interstate Visa card, First Interstate Mastercard, his
personal loans to First Security Bank and Tooele Federal Credit
Union and all other debts and obligations he has incurred since
commencement of this action and hold Plaintiff harmless,
-jjC 7. Neither party is awarded alimony.
8.

Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum

of $750.00 for theuse and benefit of her attorney to assist her
in the payment of her attorney1s fees and costs.

Each party shall

be responsible to pay the balance, if any, on their own attorney's
fees and costs incurred in this action.
9. Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to execute any and
all documents necessary to carry out the awards of property as
set forth herein.
DATED this

day of April, 198 5.

BY T:

ETH ft RIGT
DISTRICT JUDGE

Approved as to form: ,•

B. L. DART
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOAN H. ELTON,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
CURTIS BECK ELTON,
Defendant.

Civil No. 84-347
Consolidated with
Civil No. 84-348
Judge Rigtrup

This cause came on for trial at a regular term of the above
entitled Court, pursuant to notice, on March 19, 1985, before the
Honorable Kenneth •. Rigtrup, District Judge.

Plaintiff was

present in person and represented by her attorney, E. H. Fankhauser.
Defendant was present in person and represented by his attorney,
Bert L. Dart.

The Court held an informal Pre-trial conference

with counsel in chambers; and the parties thereafter, through their
respective attorneys, entered into a stipulation concerning all
of the matters in the above entitled cause of action, which stipulation was read into the record, and acknowledged, accepted and
approved by the parties hereto, and each of them and their respective

counsel; and, the Defendant having stipulated that his Complaint
(Civil No* 84-348) consolidated with this action and deemed to
be an Answer and Counterclaim, may be withdrawn and his default
entered to the Complaint of Plaintiff; and the default of Defendant
having been duly entered by the Court; and the stipulation and
settlement agreement of the parties having been approved by the
Court; and the Plaintiff having been sworn and testified in
support of the allegations of her Complaint on file herein; and
more than ninety (90) days having lapsed since the commencement
of this action; and the matter having been submitted to the
Court for its determination and decision; and the Court, being
fully advised in the premises, does now make and adopt the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Tooele County, State

of Utah and has been for more than three (3) months prior to the
commencement of this action•
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married December 28, 1977

at Las Vegas, Nevada.
3.

That no children have been born as issue of the marriage

between Plaintiff and Defendant and none are expected.
4.

During the marriage relationship Defendant treated

Plaintiff cruelly causing her to suffer mental distress and nervous
upsot in that the Defendant was very demanding of the Plaintiff
and cntized her in front of family members, relatives and friends;

exhibited a violent temper and verbally and physically abused
the Plaintiff, all of which acts caused the Plaintiff to suffer
extreme mental distress and nervous upset to such an extent that
continuation of the marriage relationship became impossible.
The parties separated on or about July 1, 1984 and have remained
separate and apart since said date.

The Court finds sufficient

cause existing for waiving the interlocutory period.
5.

Pursuant to the stipulation entered into between the

parties, through their respective attorneys, the Plaintiff is
to be awarded as her sole and separate property, free and clear
of all claims of the Defendant, the following:
(a)

All personal property owned by Plaintiff prior

to her marriage to Defendant, including and not limited
to, furniture, appliances, household furnishings; 1969
Chevrolet Corvette; 10 shares of common stock in American
Western Life; her own personal property, clothing, jewelry
and effects;
(b)

All of the furniture, furnishings, fixtures,

appliances, housekeeping supplies and effects in possession
of Plaintiff, including and not limited to, microwave oven,
dishwasher, sewing machine, two color portable television
sets, all building materials in possession of the Plaintiff;
her bank accounts in her name; the 1981 Toyota pickup truck,
subject to the balance of the obligation owing thereon to
the Tooele Federal Credit Union, which she is to assume
and pay and hold Defendant harmless;

(c)

The home and residence in Plaintiff's name

located at 280 Marvista, Tooele City, Utah, subject
to the balance of the first mortgage indebtedness owing
thereon which she is to assume and pay, free and clear
of any and all claims of the Defendant; two (2) of the
four (4) lots located in the Gold Hill Townsite, Westward
Ho Addition, Tooele County, Section 1, Township 8 South,
Range 18 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

Plaintiff

shall have thirty (30) days from the date of the Decree
of Divorce to elect which two lots she desires to be
deeded to her.

Should the Plaintiff fail to make the

election within thirty (30) days from the date of the
Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff shall be awarded Lots 18
and 26 of Block D, Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition.
Defendant will be awarded Lot 17 and 27 of Block C, Gold
Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition.
(d)

Plaintiff is to be awarded all sums on deposit

in Defendant's IRA Retirement account with Tooele Federal
Credit Union, including accumulated interest.

Defendant

is to make arrangements to transfer ownership of the
account to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff is awarded all shares

of stock presently held by the parties in Pacific Gas
and Electric comprising 100 shares of preferred stock
and 18 shares of common stock;
(e)

Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff as her share

of the equity in and to the tri-plex located at 261 Marvista
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Lane, Tooele, Utah, the sum of $10,000,00, payable
at the rate of $300.00 per month with interest of ten (10%)
percent per annum.

Payments are to commence on or before

April 15, 1985 and on or before the 15th day of each and
every month thereafter until the entire sum of $10,000.00,
together with interest at ten (10%) percent per annum is
paid in full.

Plaintiff is to have a first mortgage lien

on the tri-plex until the entire sum of $10,000.00 is
paid in full.
(f)

Defendant stipulates and agrees that he will

pay to Plaintiff to assist her in the payment of her
attorney's fees the sum of $750.00.

Said sum shall be

payable within thrity (30) days from the date of the entry
of the Decree of Divorce herein.
6.

Pursuant to the oral stipulation entered into between

the parties, through their respective attorneys, the Defendant is
to be awarded as his sole and separate property, free and clear
of all claims of the Plaintiff, the following:
(a)

The property owned by Defendant before marriage

to Plaintiff, including and not limited to, the 1976 Vega,
the Scotch Whiskey Future, proceeds from the sale of
Jonathan Logan stock, camping equipment, the black & white
television set, the other items of furniture and appliances
in his possession, and the proceeds from the sale of his
home at 990 Coleman Avenue, Tooele, Utah, which proceeds

were used to purchase the tri-plex at 261 Marvista Lane,
Tooele, Utah; his own personal property, clothing, jewelry
and effects;
(b)

Defendant's tools, table saw and drill press;

the courch and love seat received from his mother; the
bedroom set received from his mother; the washer and
dryer received from his mother; the 1985 Chevrolet van,
subject to the existing loan owing thereon which he is
to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff harmless; the one-third
(1/3) interest in the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck with
camper, subject to the balance of the loan obligation owing
thereon which Defendant is to assume and pay and hold
Plaintiff harmless; the one-half (1/2) interest in the
boat, motor and trailer; the 1978 Toyota Landcruiser;
the one-third (1/3) interest in the Willy's Jeep; the
750 Honda motorcycle with trailer; and his Federal
Retirement account with the United States Government;
(c)

Defendant is to be awarded the tri-plex located

at 261 Marvista Lane, Tooele, Utah, subject to any and
all indebtedness and encumbrances owing thereon which
Defendant is to assume and pay and subject to a first
mortgage lien in favor of Plaintiff in the sum of
$10,000,00, which lien is to be payable at the rate of
$300.00 per month with interest at the rate of ten (10%)
percent per annum, commencing April 15, 1985 and the
15th day of each and every month thereafter until paid
in full;

(d)

Two (2) of the lots located at Gold Hill

Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, subject
to the option of Plaintiff to elect within thrity (30)
days which of the two lots she desires to be awarded
to her.

In the event Plaintiff should fail to make

an election within thrity (30) days from the date of
the Decree of Divorce, Defendant shall be awarded Lots
17 and 27 of Block C, Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho
Addition, Tooele County, Utah.

Plaintiff shall be

awarded Lots 18 and 26 of Block D, Gold Hill Townsite,
Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah;
(e)

Defendant is to be awarded all right, title

and interest in and to the home recently purchased by
him located at"291 East Broadway, Tooele, Utah, subject
to any and all indebtedness owing thereon which he is
to assume and pay;
(f)

Defendant, by stipulation, is to be responsible

to assume and pay the debts and obligations owing to
GMAC for the 198 5 Chevrolet Van, GMAC for the 1978
pickup truck and camper; First Security Bank loan for
attorney's fees, Tooele Federal Credit Union for
Defendant's personal loans; the Elton estate for all
sums borrowed, Rex Elton; the Mastercard account with
Tooele Federal Credit Union; and the Visa card account
at Tooele Federal Credit Union, together with any and
all other debts and obligations he has incurred since
separation and hold Plaintiff harmless;
-7-

(g)

Plaintiff stipulates that she will be

responsible to assume and pay the debts and obligations
owing to Sears, Wards, J.C. Penneys, her truck loan to
Tooele Federal Credit Union, and all other debts and
obligations she has incurred since separation and
hold Defendant harmless;
(h)

Defendant is awarded his bank accounts in his

name except for his IRA account with Tooele Federal
Credit Union which is to be transferred to Plaintiff;
(i)

Each party stipulates and agrees that they will

execute any and all documents necessary to carry out the
transfers and awards of property, real and personal,
stipulated to, and approved by the Court.
7.

Plaintiff, at the time she married Defendant, was totally

disabled due to a loss of hearing (Tinnitus) and was receiving
disability benefits from her former employer, Tooele Ordinance
Depot.

Plaintiff receives disability benefits at the present time

of $659.00 per month gross.

Defendant is employed and working for

the United States Government at Dugway Proving Grounds and has a
gross income of $30,000.00 per year.

The parties stipulated that

alimony not be awarded to either party.

Under the present circum-

stances, it is reasonable that alimony not be awarded to either
party.
8.

Plaintiff has in force and effect a hospital and medical

insurance policy.

Defendant has in force and effect through his

employment, a hospital and medical insurance policy.
-8-

It is reason-

able that each party be required to maintain their own hospital
and medical insurance policies for their own benefit.
9.

The Court finds that the oral stipulation entered into

between the parties is reasonable under the present circumstances,
does hereby approve said stipulation and finds that the same should
be incorporated in the, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce
to be entered herein.
The Court, having made its Findings of Fact, now concludes
as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
parties.

The Court has jurisdiction of this matter and of the
The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from

the Defendant upon the grounds of mental cruelty, which Decree
is to become final upon entry.
2.

That the oral stipulation and property settlement

agreement submitted to the Court, and duly approved by the Court,
which stipulation and property settlement agreement is set forth
in the Findings of Fact hereinabove, is adopted by the Court and
is expressly incorporated in these Conclusions of Law.
3.

Plaintiff should be awarded all of the real and personal

property stipulated to be awarded to Plaintiff and as set forth
in the Findings of Facts hereinabove .
4.

Defendant should be awarded all of the real and personal

orr^r-y stipulated to be awarded Defendant as set forth in the
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Findings of Fact hereinabove.
5.

Neither party should be awarded alimony.

6.

Each of the parties should be ordered to execute any

and all documents necessary to carry out the awards of property
stipulated to between the parties and as set forth in the Findings
of Fact hereinabove;

Further, each of the parties should be

ordered to deliver those items of property in their possession
awarded to the other party.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

/i

day of April, 198 5.

BY THE COURT:

K2NNE^H 3 1 R I G T R
DISTRICT JUDGE

Approved a s t o form:

/j-.

'

(#,/'

B. L. DART
Attorney for Defendant
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WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND PCR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-oOoJOAN H. ELTON,
Plaintiff,

i
I
i

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL CR
JH THE ALTERNATIVE A MOTION
TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT

-vsCUKTIS BECK ELTON,
Defendant.

])
i

C i v i l No, 84-347
c o n s o l i d a t e d with 84-348
(Judge Rigtrup)

GOMES NOW the Plaintiff by and through her attorney of record William
B. Parsons III and moves the above entitled Court in conformity with the
provisions of Rule 59(a) and 59(e), for a new trial in the divorce proceeding
between Plaintiff and Defendant or in the alternative for an amended Judgnent
and altered Decree of Divorce,
The Plaintiff substantiates in part the Motion for a ttew Trial on the
provisions of Rule 59(a) (6) Otah Rules of Civil Procedure and asserts that no
evidence was taken by formal w o r n testimony nor were any documents adnitted
after a foundation was properly laid except the matter of grounds and
jurisdiction and the general agreement as to understanding by the Plaintiff
and that the evidence is not in any form sufficient to support the decision

or Decree or the division of property as set forth in said Decree*

The

nature of the agreements between the parties were not because of the
averments in Plaintiff's Affidavit sufficient to sustain the ckcis.;..:*• a:«"
determination of the Decree and a division of the property as is ev:<< i..« r i;.
the Decree is not supported even by the general averments, proffers and
representations, the nature of the division being excessive in favor of the
Defendant, prejudicial to the rights of the Plaintiff, and not in the
interest of justice*
Rule 59(a)(1-4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, require Affidavits to
substantiate and support them as foundations for a new trial and the
Plaintiff has in her Affidavit asserted irregularities in the proceedings
which prevented her fron having a fair trial, entitling her to a new trial on
the merits*
In the alternative, should the Court not grant a new trial, the
Plaintiff requests an extension of time in which to supply additional
Affidavits to evidence such a disproportionate distribution of property
acquired during the course of the marriage in favor of the Defendant and
against the Plaintiff's best interest as to entitle the Plaintiff to an
amendment of the existing Judgment and Decree of Divorce.

It is the

assertion of the Plaintiff that the distribution evidenced by the existing
Decree so disproportionately favors the Defendant as to not be reasonable*
prudent or in the interest of justice and as to not otherwise be justified
based upon the evidence or proffers made at the time of the original hearing*
DATED this

day of

r"4fi^_"L

, 1985.

zJ

fV . & .

TQ.h fin.* . ?**-

WILLIAM B. PARSONS III
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICAIE
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing was mailed postage prepaid this

3&

day of

AfUj (

, 1985,

to:
B.L. Dart
DART, ADAMSON, PARKEN & PROCTOR
310 South Main #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Je^i Gay Canter, Secretary
Secret

WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OOURT
IN AND FCR TOOELE COUNTY, STA0E OP UTAH
-oOoJOAN H. ELTON,
AFFIDAVIT
Plaintiff,
-vsCURTIS BECK ELTON,

Defendant.

Civil No. 84-347
consolidated with
Civil NO. 84-348
(Judge Rigtrup)

I, Joan H. Elton, being first duly sworn do hereby depose and say that:
1.

I am the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter.

2. A divorce trial was conducted between myself and the Defendant on
or about the 19th day of March, 1985,
3. A Decree of Divorce, as the final Judgment in that proceeding, was
signed by the Court and filed with Tooele County Cleric's office on April 16,
1985.
4. That as the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter at the time of
the divorce trial I was pressured by iry attorney into the settlement, I did
not agree with the context of the settlement and was told by iry attorney that
he was going to see that it took place in the fashion that the decree

evidences.
5. That I wear a hearing aide and cannot hear with out it.
<^/£

6.

That on the day of the divorce trial I could not hear because my

hearing aide was not functioning properly and because I had at that time a
severe ear infection and I told ny attorney, E.H. Fankhauser, of ny problem,
asked him to seek a continuance and he refused insisting that the proceeding
go forward anyway.
7. That irregularities in the proceeding of the Court occurred in that
the Defendant's counsel, B.L. Dart, had an extended conference with the Judge
before Plaintiff's counsel arrived at the Court.
8. That the evidence is not sufficient in any form to support the
decision as evidenced in the Decree of Divorce dividing the marital estate in
that with limited particularity the following is asserted:
A. That the evidence was that the Tri-Plex acquired by the parties
during the course of the marriage had a fair market value of
well in excess of $80,000.00, that the evidence clearly
indicated that the Defendant contributed no more than
$31,000.00 of monies brought in to the marriage to the
acquisition of the Tri-Plex and that the Plaintiff was awarded
oily a $10,000.00 lien against the Tri-Plex therefore granting
in excess of a $40,000.00 difference and a $30,000.00 windfall
to the Defendant.
B. That even if the Tri-Plex was valued at $68,000.00 the
arithmetical computation would indicate that the Defendant
still accrued a two to one equity benefit in the distribution

X \

^ \j^

../•

\^1A \/r

of that marital property.

9. That considerable additional marital property was improperly

valued and that the Defendant accrued substantial excessive distribution per
the Decree.
$ ^rL
^\y
^

10. Ihat the Plaintiff through the contribution of timef labor and
monies during the course of this eight year marriage also made substantial
contribution to the equity in the properties including the Tri-Plex which
should have reduced the Defendant's disproportionate original investment to
zero.
11. Ihat in essence the Defendant caused the Plaintiff's present
physical disability to sane degree by virtue of the beatings and physical

A

abuse that the Defendant subjected the Plaintiff to during the course of the
marriage, limiting the Plaintiff's capacity to sustain herself following the
division of their matrimonial bonds and yet no alimony has been awarded by
the Court and the Plaintiff asserts that this is a clear abuse of discretion
entitling the Plaintiff alone under the previsions of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 59(a)(1) to a new trial.
Further the Affiant saith not.
DA3ED this 2 5 day of

fjp^i

Q

, 1985.

f^^^

S l H . ELTON

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

day of

N<#ary Publ^/
My Ccnntission Expires:

Af^

1985

MAILIN3 CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore^t>

day of ftClAx j)

JetfL Gc

Secretary

going Affidavit was mailed postage prepaid this
1985, to:
B.L. Dart
DART, ADAMSON. PARKEN & PROCTOR
310 South Main #1330
Salt Lake City, Dtah 84101

.

B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Defendant
Suite 1330
310 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
JOAN H. ELTON,
Plaintiff,

:

ORDER

v.

:

Civil No. 84-347
(Consolidated with 84-34*

CURTIS BECK ELTON,

:
Judge Rigtrup

Defendant.

:
oooOooo

Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial or in the Alternati
to Amend Judgment entered in this action came on regularly for
hearing on the 20th day of May, 1985, at the hour of 1:00 p.m.,
plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney William B.
Parsons III, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorn
B, L. Dart, and the Court having heard argument from respective
counsel, and the transcript from the divorce proceeding having I
offered and received as an exhibit, and the Court having reviewe
the presentations and being fully advised,
1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff Joan H. Elton's
Motion for a New Trial and her Motion in the Alternative to Amend
the Judgment are both denied.
DATED this

day of

, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of May, 1985, I
mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to:
William B. Parsons III
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant.
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